[참고문헌] Alex Byrne and Agustín Rayo, 2015년 1학기 Topics in Philosophy of Mind(Mental Content) 강의계획서

MIT 언어 및 철학과 대학원 개설 과목

Part I: De Se Thought

1

- Perry, John. "The Problem of the Essential Indexical." Nous 13, no. 1 (1979): 3–21. (Blackwell Publishing)

- Lewis, David. "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se." The Philosophical Review 88, no. 4 (1979): 513–43. (Duke University Press)

2

- Anscombe, G. E. M. "The First Person."

- Stalnaker, Robert C. "Indexical Belief." Synthese 49, no. 1 (1981): 129–51.

Supplementary Reading

- Kripke, Saul. Chapter 10 in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1. Oxford University Press, 2011. 

- Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapter 3 in Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press, 2010. 

- Campbell, John. "What Is It to Know What 'I' Refers To?" The Monist 87, no. 2 (2004): 206–18.

3

- Cappelen, Herman, and Josh Dever. Chapters 3 and 5 in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press, 2013. 

Supplementary Reading

- Magidor, Ofra. "The Myth of the De Se."

- Ninan, Dilip. "What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?" 

- Devitt, Michael. "The Myth of the Problematic De Se."

Part II: Propositions

4

- Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapter 1 in Inquiry. MIT Press, 1984.

- Field, Hartry. "Critical Notice: Stalnaker, Robert - Inquiry." Philosophy of Science 53, no. 3. (1986): 425–48.

Supplementary Reading

- Rayo, Agustín. Chapter 4 in The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press, 2013. 

- Elga, Adam, and Agustín Rayo . "Fragmentation and Information Access."

5

- King, Jeffrey C., Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks. Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 12 in New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 32–5, 47–50, 64–70, 72–6, and 91–7.

Part III: Knowing How

6

- Stanley, Jason, and Timothy Williamson. "Knowing How." The Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 8 (2001): 411–44.

- Noë, Alva. "Against Intellectualism." Analysis 65, no. 288 (2005): 278–90.

Supplementary Reading

- Fodor, Jerry A. "The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation." The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 20 (1968): 27–640.

- Glick, Ephraim. "Practical Modes of Presentation." Nous 49, no. 3 (2015): 538–59.

- ———. "Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 2 (2011): 398–434.

7

- Stanley, Jason. Chapter 7 in Know How. Oxford University Press, 2011.

- Rumfitt, Ian. "Savoir Faire." The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 3 (2003): 158–66.

Supplementary Reading

- Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. University Of Chicago Press, 2000. 

- Santorio, Paolo. "Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics." 

- Snowdon, Paul. "I—Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 104, no. 1 (2004): 1–29.

Part IV: Perceptual Content

8

- Logue, Heather. "Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliation."

Supplementary Reading

- Brewer, Bill. "How To Account For Illusion." 

- Siegel, Susanna. "Do Perceptual Experiences Have Contents?" 2009.

* Byrne, Alex. "Experience and Content." The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 429–51.

- Schellenberg, Susanna. "Perceptual Content Defended." Nous 45, no. 4 (2011): 714–50.

- Pautz, Adam. "What Are The Contents of Experiences?" The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 483–507.

9

- Speaks, Jeff. "Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content?" The Philosophical Review 114, no. 3 (2005): 359–98.

- Van Cleve, James. "Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States." Philosophical Perspectives 26, no. 1 (2012): 411–30.

Supplementary Reading

- Byrne, Alex. "Perception and Conceptual Content." 

10

- McDowell, John. "Lecture III: Non-conceptual Content." In Mind and World. Harvard University Press, 1994.

- ———. "Avoiding the Myth of the Given."

Supplementary Reading

- Travis, Charles. "The Silences of the Senses." Mind 113, no. 449 (2004): 57–94.

Part V: The Knowledge Argument

11

- McDowell, John. "Avoiding the Myth of the Given."

- Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." The Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 127–36.

- Byrne, Alex, Review of Ludlow, et al. "There's Something About Mary." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009.

- Rayo, Agustín. Section 4.5 in The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press, 2013.

12

- Ball, Derek. "There Are No Phenomenal Concepts." Mind 118, no. 472 (2009): 935–62.

- Tye, Michael. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. MIT Press, 2011, pp. 123–37.

13

- Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapters 2–4 in Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press, 2008